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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to review the priorities for pay-
ment of underinsured and uninsured motorist benefits. The article
discusses the applicability of a "closeness to the risk" analysis in
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making determinations regarding insurance benefits when multi-
ple policies apply to a claim for underinsured and uninsured bene-
fits.
Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the issue
of multiple excess insurance policies applicable to the same under-
insured motorist claim. In each of the two cases, the injured claim-
ant had access to two separate, excess insurance policies-a policy
insuring the injured claimant as a named insured, and a policy in-
suring the claimant by virtue of resident relative status. In each of
the two decisions, and for the first time in Minnesota, the courts
used a "closeness to the risk" analysis to deny an injured individual
access to coverage from an applicable insurance policy.
There is no precedent for using this "closeness to the risk"
analysis as was done in Frishman v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.,' and
Heinen v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.2 Each case deprived an in-
jured person of benefits from an applicable policy under which he
was an insured. In the decades of prior decisions employing
"closeness to the risk" as a legal principle, courts have used the doc-
trine only to establish the sequence in which the applicable insur-
ance policies would be applied. These two decisions represent an
unprecedented misuse of the "closeness to the risk" analysis in an
area where such an analysis has been statutorily precluded by Min-
nesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5).
This article reviews the underinsured (UIM) and uninsured
(UM) priorities as enacted in 1985 as well as the "closeness to the
risk" doctrine as used in sequencing cases in Minnesota. Is it ap-
propriate to consider "closeness to the risk" for excess UIM or UM
claims in light of section 65B.49 subdivision 3a(5)? If such an
analysis were used, does it actually clarify which of the policies in
question is truly "closer to the risk"?
II. BRIEF HISTORIcAL BACKGROUND
A. Underinsured Coverage (UIM)
It is important to know something of the historical background
of underinsured (UIM) coverage in order to determine which of
the past Minnesota Supreme Court decisions have been superseded
1. No. C3-94-1654, 1995 WL 34842 (Minn. Ct App.Jan 31, 1995).
2. 566 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
[Vol. 24
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by statutory changes.
1. 1972 to 1974
Minnesota Statutes section 65B.25 required that UIM coverage
be "made available" by insurance companies! UIM at this time was
a "difference of limits" coverage. The UIM coverage actually avail-
able to an injured claimant would be calculated by first deductingS . 4
liability insurance limits from the UIM limits. There was no statu-tory scheme for the priority of payment.
2. 1975 to April 12, 1980
On January 1, 1975, the Minnesota No-Fault Act took effect.
Insurers were now required to offer optional UIM coverage.5 The
coverage was changed from "difference of limits" to an "add on" or
"excess" coverage.
Because the statute required an offer of UIM coverage, the
courts would impose UIM coverage as a matter of law if an insur-
ance company could not show that it had made a commercially rea-
6sonable offer of UIM coverage. In response to Holman, the legisla-
ture revised the statute. However, the statute still did not contain a
priority scheme for payment of underinsured benefits in situations
where an insured was injured while not occupying his or her own
vehicle.
The courts determined the priority for payment of UIM and
UM coverage in the absence of a statutory priorities scheme. Integ-
rity Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters
Insurance Co. determined the priority for payment for UIM cover-
age, and also set forth the legal principles to be applied when two
insurance policies covering an accident contain conflicting excess
insurance clauses.8
3. April 12, 1980 to October 1, 1985
During this period, Minnesota statutes did not mention UIM
3. SeeJacobson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. 1978).
4. See Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977).
5. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49. subd. 6(e) (repealed 1980).
6. See Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (1980).
7. See Integrity Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters Ins. Co., 307
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coverage. Judicial decisions continued to clarify the nature and
scope of the coverage.9
4. October 1, 1985 to August 1, 1989
In 1985 significant legislative changes were made. UIM cover-
age was once again made part of the statute governing motor vehi-
cle insurance. During this period, UIM was part of a single com-
bined coverage with uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. It was a
"difference of limits" coverage. The statute governing underin-
sured and uninsured motorist claims during this period was Minne-
sota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a.
Of particular importance, for purposes of this article, the stat-
ute created a new system of priorities to determine which underin-
sured (or uninsured) motorist policies would apply to an individ-
ual's underinsured and uninsured motorist claims. This is set forth
in Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5). The pri-
orities set forth by the statute are identical for payment of both un-
derinsured and uninsured claims, which is discussed below.
5. August 1, 1989 to present
Since August 1, 1989, UIM coverage has been a separate cov-
erage which must be included in every Minnesota motor vehicle in-
surance policy. It is once again an "add on" coverage. The priori-
ties for this coverage continued to be governed by Minnesota
Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a.
B. Uninsured Coverage
Minnesota passed legislation in 1967 which required unin-
sured (UM) coverage for all vehicles registered or principally ga-
raged in the state. After adoption of the Minnesota No-Fault Act in
1975, UM coverage remained a mandatory coverage in every insur-
ance policy issued or delivered in Minnesota.
1. October 1, 1985 to present
As indicated above, effective October 1, 1985, significant
9. See Sobania v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 371 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1985); Sib-
bert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 371 N.W.2d 201 (Minn. 1985); Hoeschen v.
South Carolina Ins. Co., 378 N.W.2d (Minn. 1985); Amco Ins. Co. v. Lang, 420
N.W.2d 895 (Minn. 1988).
[Vol. 24
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changes were made regarding UM and UIM coverage. One such
change-the creation of a priority scheme for payment of both UM
and UIM benefits-is at Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivi-
sion 3a(5).
C. Post-1985 Statutory Priorities: UM and UIM Claims
Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5) which
explicitly sets forth the statutory system of priorities for UIM and
UM coverages, provides:
If at the time of the accident the injured person is occupy-
ing a motor vehicle, the limit of liability for uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverages available to the injured
person is the limit specified for that motor vehicle. How-
ever, if the injured person is occupying a motor vehicle of
which the injured person is not an insured, the injured
person may be entitled to excess insurance protection af-
forded by a policy in which the injured party is otherwise
insured. The excess insurance protection is limited to the
extent of covered damages sustained, and further is avail-
able only to the extent by which the limit of liability for
like coverage applicable to any one motor vehicle listed
on the automobile insurance policy which the injured
person is an insured exceeds the limit of liability of the
coverage available to the injured person from the occu-
pied motor vehicle.
If at the time of the accident the injured person is not
occupying a motor vehicle or motorcycle, the injured per-
son is entitled to select any one limit of liability for any
one vehicle afforded by a policy under which the injured
person is insured.10
The statutory provision provides a reasonably simple structure
for determining which company pays UIM or UM benefits. The
two coverages are discussed together because the priority for pay-
ment of the two coverages is identical. Where issues of priority are
decided, courts have typically relied on precedent involving one
coverage to resolve issues on the other coverage. Applying the
statutory priorities scheme is most easily described by posing two
questions.
Question #1: Was the person injured while occupying a vehicle?
If the person was not occupying a vehicle, the UIM or UM
10. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996).
1998]
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claim may be made against any one policy providing coverage. No
additional claim may be made.
If the person was occupying a vehicle, the UIM or UM claim
must go first to the coverage on the occupied vehicle. The second
question is then posed to determine if any additional claim may be
made.
Question #2: Was the injured person insured by the policy covering the
occupied vehicle?
If the injured person is an insured on the policy covering the
occupied vehicle, there can be only one UM or UIM claim. This
single claim must go to the policy on the occupied vehicle.
However, If the injured person is not an insured on the policy
for the occupied vehicle, the legislature allows this person to seek
additional excess coverage from another policy which covers the
injured person. It is this opportunity to seek excess coverage which
the Heinen decision incorrectly limits."
IlI. APPLICATION OF STATUTORY PRIORITIES
An illustration of the facts giving rise to the type of claim at is-
sue in Heinen is instructive. An eighteen-year-old claimant is riding
in a friend's car. The car has no insurance. The friend is careless
and goes off the road. The claimant is seriously injured and has a
valid uninsured motorist claim. The eighteen-year-old claimant is a
named insured in his own auto insurance policy and has limits of
$30,000. The claimant is also insured as a resident relative under
his parent's policy, with $100,000 in UM coverage.12
THE ISSUE: since the claimant is not an insured on any policy cover-
ing the occupied vehicle, is he able to elect a UM claim against his parents'
policy?
11. See generally Heinen v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 378 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1997).
12. If the parents' insurance policy contained the statutory definition of the
term "insured," see Minn. Stat. § 65B.43 subd. 5, then the eighteen-year-old would
not be covered by the parents' policy. Under the statutory definition, a person
named in his or her own policy is not covered as "insured" based upon status as a
resident relative.
Insurers who choose to use the statutory definition of "insured" in their poli-
cies would be able to avoid the possibility of being selected for the excess claims.
See Gaalswyck v. General Cas. Co., 372 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Insur-
ers who choose not to follow the statutory definition are bound to provide the
coverage set forth in the insurance policy. See generally Burgraff v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Co., 346 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 1984).
[Vol. 24
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It is argued that the coverage which identifies the claimant as a
named insured should provide the applicable source of benefits,
rather than any other policy which insures the claimant as a resi-
dent relative. There is nothing in the explicit statutory language to
support this argument. Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49 subdivi-
sion 3a(5) provides in part: "However, if the injured person is oc-
cupying a motor vehicle of which the injured person is not an in-
sured, the injured person may be entitled to excess insurance
protection afforded by a policy in which the injured party is otherwise in-
sured."' This statutory language makes no distinction between a
policy which insures the injured person by name and a policy which
insures the person by virtue of status as a resident relative.
A plain reading of the statute indicates that the legislature set
up a priority system keyed to the occupancy of a vehicle. When a
claimant occupies a vehicle which covers the claimant as an "in-
sured," the claimant is always limited to this coverage. Once a per-
son is outside of the covered vehicle, however, the legislature does
nothing to limit this person's choice of coverage.
When enacting the current priority system in 1985, the legisla-
ture certainly knew that some insurers might extend coverage be-
yond the requirements of statutory mandates. Minnesota Statutes
section 65B.49, subdivision 7 states:
Additional benefits and coverage not prohibited. Nothing
in section 65B.41 to 65B.71 shall be construed as prevent-
ing the insurer from offering other benefits or coverages
in addition to those required to be offered under this sec-
tion.
14
Additionally, courts have consistently held that if the policy af-
fords broader coverage than required by the Act, the insured is en-
15titled to coverage under the terms of the policy as written.
Aside from claims by an injured person who occupies a vehicle
for which the person is an "insured," the legislature allows an in-
jured person to claim excess coverage on any applicable excess UM
or UIM policy.
This issue was addressed in Nerud v. National Family Insurance
Co. In Nerud, a man was injured in a one-car accident while occu-
13. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996) (emphasis added).
14. Id., subd. 7.
15. See Austin Mut. Ins. Co. v. Templin, 435 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
16. No. CX-94-1702, 1994 WL 695040 (Minn. Ct. App. December 13, 1994).
1998]
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pying his friend's uninsured car. Since he had no coverage from
the occupied vehicle, he was entitled to UM coverage from one
other policy in which he was otherwise insured pursuant to Minne-
sota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5). He was an insured
under two policies. He was a named insured in a policy for his own
car which had $30,000 in UM coverage. He was also defined as an
insured by virtue of his resident relative status under his parents'
$100,000 UM endorsement because of a broader definition of "in-
sureds." The court of appeals held that the parents' policy had to
provide the $100,000 in UM coverage when he made a claim
against this policy.
More recently, however, two Minnesota Court of Appeals deci-
sions reached the opposite result.17 The courts in those decisions
purported to rely on a "closeness to the risk" analysis in reviewing
the issue. For the first time in Minnesota, the courts relied upon a
"closeness to the risk" analysis to diminish the amount of insurance
coverage available to injured claimants.'
Prior to these decisions, the "closeness to the risk" doctrine
was used only to establish the sequence in which the applicable in-
surance policies would be applied. Courts use it to determine the
sequence of coverage for multiple insurance policies containing
"other insurance" or "excess insurance" clauses, and which applied
to the same loss. The doctrine was never before employed to di-
minish available insurance coverage or to deprive injured claimants
of access to applicable insurance policies.
IV. CLOSENESS TO THE RISK ANALYSIS IN MINNESOTA
When establishing the sequence of coverage among insurance
companies covering the same risk, Minnesota courts typically use a
two-step analysis. First, the courts attempt to read each policy's
"other insurance" clause so as to reconcile them. If the policies
cannot be reconciled, the second step is to establish the sequence
of coverage for the loss among the several policies by considering
the "closeness to the risk" or the overall insuring intent of each in-
surance policy. The courts use this analysis to determine the se-
quence of payment among the multiple insurance policies.
17. See Frishman v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., No. C3-94-1654, 1995 WL 34842
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan 31, 1995); Heinen v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 378
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The supreme court in Integrity Mutual Insurance Co. v. State
Automobile & Casualty Underwriters Insurance Co.1 9 set forth the legal
principles to be applied when two insurance policies covering an
accident contain conflicting excess insurance clauses. The court
there stated:
Often two or more companies would be fully liable for a
loss but for their respective other insurance clauses, and
many times those clauses conflict in their provisions.
When it is clear that two or more companies are among
themselves liable to the insured for his loss but the appor-
tionment among the companies cannot be made without
violating the other insurance clause of at least one com-
pany, then the courts must look outside the policies for
rules of apportionment. One approach, known as the
Lamb-Weston doctrine, is to require, when 'other insur-
ance' clauses conflict, that the loss be prorated among the
insurers on the basis of their respective limits of liability.
Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Or. 110, 341
P.2d 110 (1959).
The approach of the Minnesota court has traditionally
been more complex than the Lamb-Weston doctrine. In
Federal Ins. Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 231, 153
N.W.2d 429, 437 (1967), we stated that the better ap-
proach is to allocate respective policy coverages in light of
the total policy insuring intent, as determined by the pri-
mary policy risks upon which each policy's premiums were
based and as determined by the primary function of each
policy. The Minnesota courts examine the policies and
determine whether the insurers are concurrently liable on
the risk, or one is primarily liable and another only sec-
ondarily liable. If they are concurrently liable, each must
pay a pro rata share of the entire loss. Woodrich Const. Co.
v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 252 Minn. 86, 89
N.W.2d 412 (1958); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ac-
cident & Ind. Co., 190 Minn. 528, 252 N.W. 434, 253 N.W.
888 (1934). On the other hand, if one insurer is primarily
liable and the other only secondarily, the primary insurer
must pay up to its limit of liability, and then the secondary
insurer must pay for any excess up to its own limit of li-
ability. Eicher v. Universal Underwriters, 250 Minn. 7, 83
N.W.2d 895 (1957). In addition, some coverages may be
neither primary nor secondary, but tertiary in their appli-
19. 307 Minn. 173, 239 N.W.2d 445 (1976).
1998]
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cation.
The nub of the Minnesota doctrine is that coverages of a given
risk shall be 'stacked'for payment in the order of their closeness to
the risk. That is, the insurer whose coverage was effected
for the primary purpose of insuring that risk will be liable
first for payment, and the insurer whose coverage of the
risk was the most incidental to the basic purpose of its in-
suring intent will be liable last. If two coverages contem-
plate the risk equally, then the two companies providing
those coverages will prorate the liability between them-
selves on the basis of their respective limits of liability.
20
In Integrity, the court determined the sequence of applicable
uninsured motorist coverage. The issue was the priority for pay-
ment as between two applicable UM policies containing conflicting
"other insurance" clauses; which of the two policies should be
"stacked for payment first." The injured person had been killed
while occupying a car owned and insured by his father. The father
owned two automobiles, both of which were covered under the
same policy. The decedent owned three vehicles, all insured under
a single policy.
The supreme court determined that the coverage of the in-
volved vehicle was primary because most closely related to the risk.
The next closest coverages were those covering the decedent's own
three cars because that policy contemplated coverage for him while
driving another vehicle as incidental to its main coverage. The
coverage on the father's uninvolved vehicle was held to be furthest
from the risk and therefore, the last coverage to be subject to pay-
ment.
The "closeness to the risk" analysis was used in this decision
only to determine the sequence of the applicable UM coverages.
Integrity was decided before the 1985 legislative changes which both
eliminated stacking and added an explicit priority scheme.2' With
no statutory priority scheme in place, the Integrity court had to
make a priority determination for payment of the two UM policies
which covered the decedent. After the enactment of section
65B.49, subdivision 3a(5), which specifically describes the priority
for payment for a UM or UIM claims, a "closeness to the risk"
analysis would no longer be appropriate. The statute creates its
own priority system and should preempt any application of a
20. Id. at 173, 239 N.W.2d at 446 (emphasis added).
21. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996).
[Vol. 24
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"closeness to the risk" analysis. Minnesota courts have applied the
22Integrity rule in a number of subsequent decisions.
A. The Elements of the Closeness to the Risk Analysis
In Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Northstar Mutual Insurance Co.,
23
the supreme court set forth three general factors for consideration
in making a "closeness to the risk" determination.
(1) Which policy specifically described the acci-
dent-causing instrumentality?
(2) Which premium is reflective of the greater contem-
plated exposure?
(3) Does one policy contemplate the risk and use of the
accident-causing instrumentality with greater specificity
than the other policy, that is, is coverage of the risk pri-
mary in one policy and incidental to the other?
24
Auto Owners involved a determination of the sequence of pay-
ment of two different liability policies, each covering a loss. In Auto
Owners, a claim was made involving the negligent operation of a
boat. The driver of the boat was not the owner, but was using the
boat with the permission of the owner. The driver hurt two indi-
viduals who then sued both the driver and owner of the boat. The
driver's homeowner's policy contained an excess insurance clause
applicable to the boat accident. The owner of the boat had a gen-
eral liability policy which specifically described the boat, and for
which the owner paid an additional premium. Both policies con-
tained "excess" or "other" insurance clauses.
The driver's homeowner's insurer brought a declaratory
judgment action against the insurer of the boat owner. The su-
preme court concluded that the "excess clauses" in the policies
conflicted and could not be reconciled, necessitating a "closeness
to the risk" analysis to determine the sequence of payment of the
two policies. Using the general factors cited above, the court held
that coverage under the boat owner's general liability policy was
closer than the homeowner's coverage, to the risk of the boat acci-
dent.
The court reasoned that the boat owner's policy specifically
22. See, e.g., Doerner v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 337 N.W.2d 394 (Minn.
1983); Hennekens v. All Nation Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1980).
23. 281 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 1979).
24. Id. at 704.
1998]
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described the accident causing instrumentality, whereas the driver's
homeowner's policy did not. The boat owner actually paid specific
additional premiums for coverage on the boat. The driver's policy
did not. Finally, the owner's policy contemplated with greater
specificity, risk of liability for personal injury by use of a boat.
B. Closeness to the Risk in UM and UIM Cases
Before the October 1, 1985, legislative changes, which set forth
the priority for payment for UM and UIM coverages, other Minne-
sota courts, relying on Integrity used a "closeness to the risk" analysis
to determine the sequence for payment of UM and UIM coverages.
In Boroos v. Roseau Agency, Inc., the plaintiffs were injured while
riding in county vehicles. The county owned several automobiles
which it insured with UIM coverage. Each plaintiff had a personal
policy with no UIM coverage. The court cited Integrity for the pro-
cedure for determining priority of coverage when more than one
insurer may be liable. The court concluded that the occupied
(county) vehicle had first priority application with the personal
policies of the injured occupants applicable thereafter.
The Boroos court stated:
[A] t first view it would appear that Integrity mandates that
the order of liability be as follows: 1) The Home for the
first $50,000 covering the involved vehicle, 2) State Farm
and Milbank to their policy limits, and 3) The Home for
the remainder up to its total policy limits.
Despite the similarity of the two cases, however, the dif-
ference lies in the "total policy insuring intent" of the
policies. Because The Home's policy is ambiguous, we
construe the policy against the insurer and hold that
stacked coverage is provided by The Home policy which is
"closest to the risk." 6
After the 1985 enactment of Minnesota Statutes section
65B.49, subdivision 3a(5), the priority for payment of UIM and UM
claims is statutorily mandated. Determinations concerning the se-
quence of applicability of UM and UIM claims is now governed by
statute. A "closeness to the risk" analysis is now precluded and
would neither be required nor appropriate.
25. 345 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
26. Id. at 791.
[Vol. 24
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C. Recent Use of Closeness to the Risk in UIM and UM Claims
In Frishman v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.,27 the court con-
cluded that the specific statutory priority scheme did not ade-
quately determine which policy applied to a loss. Consequently,
the court stated that the determination must be based upon a
common law "closeness to the risk analysis," The court reached the
opposite result as the same court in Nerud v. National Family Insur-
ance Co.
28
In Frishman, just as in Nerud, an individual was injured in a one-
car accident. She was not an "insured" on the policy for the occu-
pied vehicle, so under the second priority, sought UIM coverage
from a policy in which she was otherwise insured pursuant to Min-
nesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5). She was insured
in two policies. She was a named insured in a policy for her own
car which had $30,000 in UIM coverage. She was also defined as an
insured by virtue of her resident relative status, in her parents'
$50,000 UIM policy.
The court apparently reviewed Minnesota Statutes section
65B.49, subdivision 3a(5) and acknowledged that the statute con-
tained the priorities scheme for UIM coverage. Instead of follow-
ing the statutory priorities, the court attempted to support its con-
clusion by making a distinction between occupants and passengers.
The court noted that because the claimant was occupying a motor
vehicle but could not seek UIM benefits under the policy insuring
the vehicle,
she is entitled to seek excess UIM benefits afforded by "a
policy" otherwise providing coverage for her.
By contrast, the statute specifically declares that an in-
jured person who is not an occupant of a motor vehicle is
"entitled to select any one limit of liability" for any one
vehicle afforded by a policy covering the injured person.
Because the legislature omitted the same explicit right of
selection for vehicle occupants who are not insured under
the policy on the involved vehicle, we apply common-law
principles to determine the priority of coverage.' 9
27. No. C3-94-1654 1995 WL 34842 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan 31, 1995).
28. No. CX-94-1702, 1994 WL 695040 (Minn. Ct. App. December 13, 1994).
The panel court of appeals in both Frishman and Nerud was composed of the same
judges. The Nerud decision was issued on December 13, 1994. The Frishman deci-
sion was issued onJanuary 31, 1995.
29. SeeFrishman, 1995 WL 3482, at *2.
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The court stated that it was to "establish the priority among
two potentially applicable policies affording UIM coverage to
Frishman, and Integrity's closeness-to-the-risk analysis is the com-
mon law principle that governs this priority issue."30 Without dis-
cussing any of the "closeness to the risk" factors set forth in Auto
Owners Insurance Co. v. Northstar Mutual Insurance Co.,3 1 the court
simply concluded that the insurance policy which named the
claimant, ($30,000) was "closer to the risk" than the policy which
insured the claimant by virtue of her status as a resident relative of
the named insured ($50,000). The court stated:
The American Family policy specifically contemplated the
possibility that the named insured, Frishman, would be in-
jured while a passenger in a vehicle she did not own. The
Illinois Farmers policy, on the other hand, only indirectly
considered the possibility that Marvin Frishman's resident
32relatives would be injured in vehicles they did not own.
This conclusion has no basis in law or fact. The Frishman court
offered no explanation as to how it concluded the Farmers policy
only "indirectly" considered the possibility that resident relatives
would be injured in vehicles they did not own. Each policy of in-
surance explicitly covered the risk that insureds would be injured
in vehicles they did not own. Each policy specifically indicated that
coverage was provided under these circumstances. Neither policy
is closer to this risk. No reasonable interpretation of that factor
puts one of the policies "closer to the risk" than the other. The
court offered no other analysis to support its conclusion that the
policy naming the injured person was closer to the risk.
The Frishman court focused on the difference in the specific
language in section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5), between occupants
of vehicles and pedestrians. The language pertaining to excess
claims for occupants reads as follows:
The excess insurance protection is limited to the extent of
covered damages sustained, and further is available only
to the extent by which the limit of liability for like cover-
age applicable to any one motor vehicle listed on the auto-
mobile insurance policy which the injured person is an insured
exceeds the limit of liability of the coverage available to
30. See id.
31. 281 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1979).
32. SeeFrishman, 1995 WL 3482, at *2.
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the injured person from the occupied motor vehicle. 3
The language pertaining to claims for pedestrians reads as fol-
lows:
If at the time of the accident the injured person is not oc-
cupying a motor vehicle or motorcycle, the injured person
is entitled to select any one limit of liability for any one vehicle af-
forded by a policy under which the injured person is insured3 4
To the Frishman court, the fact that the statutory language re-
garding pedestrians indicates that the injured person is "entitled to
select," whereas the language regarding occupants indicated that
the excess coverage comes from coverage "applicable to any one
motor vehicle listed on the automobile insurance policy which the
injured person is an insured," meant that the claimant had no ight
to select which policy to make the claim. Somehow this caused the
court to conclude that the statutory priorities scheme should not
be used to determine the source of available coverage.
The Frishman court did acknowledge that the larger Illinois
Farmers policy contained a broader definition of the term "in-
sured" than required by statute. Had the Farmers policy used the
statutory definition of insured, the explicit language of section
65B.49 subdivision 3a(5) would have mandated that the claimant
submit her claim to the insurance policy which named her. But
Farmers chose to afford greater coverage than statutorily man-
dated. This did not have a noticeable effect on the court's deci-
sion. Essentially, the court gave Farmers the benefit of a narrower
definition of the term "insured" than written by Farmers in its own
policy.
There was no need for a "closeness to the risk" analysis to de-
termine which coverage applied in this case. The Frishman court in
effect provided Farmers with the benefit of narrow definitional
language which Farmers chose to forego. Frishman incorrectly de-
prived a claimant of applicable insurance coverage by relying on an
analysis which has been statutorily precluded. Moreover, the only
"closeness to the risk" factor discussed in the opinion provides no
rationale for holding that the policy naming the injured person was
in fact "closer to the risk."
The second recent "closeness to the risk" case is Heinen v. Illi-
35
nois Farmers Insurance Company. It has exactly the same failings as
33. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996) (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. 566 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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Frishman. In Heinen, Jamie Heinen was severely injured as a pas-
senger in a friend's vehicle. He had UIM coverage as a named in-
sured from his own car in the amount of $30,000. He was also cov-
ered as an insured under his parents $100,000 UIM policy by virtue
of his resident relative status. Both policies were with Farmers.
Each policy stated that, for claims arising from use of a non-owned
vehicle, the policy "shall be excess over any other collectible insur-
ance." The court of appeals held that a "closeness to the risk"
analysis should be used because there was a conflict between the
two policies providing coverage tojamie Heinen.
The conclusion that the language of the policies conflicts is
not likely correct. The statutory scheme requires a person to seek
UM and UIM coverage first from the occupied vehicle. One other
applicable policy will provide excess coverage. The language of the
Farmers' policy should be read in light of the statute. Each appli-
cable insurance policy simply follows the statute by identifying the
Farmers' coverage as excess over the collectible coverage from the
occupied vehicle. The conclusion which should follow is that each
policy should pay a pro rata share of the UIM claim, because each
is equally applicable to the single claim for excess insurance al-
lowed by the statute. Nevertheless, the court deprived Heinen of
the $100,000 in coverage which had been purchased in his parents'
policy.
After first determining that the identical "other insurance"
clauses conflicted, the court then pretended to follow the "close-
ness to the risk" factors set out in Auto Owners v. Northstar. The
court stated:
Although the Farmers policies provide overlapping cover-
age for the same risk, we conclude that Heinen's policy is
closer to the risk because (1) Heinen's own insurance pol-
icy specifically describes the accident-causing instrumen-
tality, describing the automobile in which he was a pas-
senger, (2) Heinen has paid a premium for the policy
under which he is insured, providing coverage for his own
injuries, more closely contemplated a potential claim by
him for UIM coverage, and (3) the premium charged is
related to the contemplated risks.'r
Given the statutory priorities scheme, the Heinen court should
never have used a "closeness to the risk" analysis. Again, the legisla-
ture has precluded this analysis by enacting priorities for excess
36. Id. at 380.
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claims. If Farmers uses the definition of "insured" as set forth at
Minnesota Statutes section 65B.43, subdivision 5, the injured
claimant is limited to the coverage on the policy naming him. This
is the policy he bought and the statute would require him to submit
his claim to this company. But Farmers chose not to use the statu-
tory definition. Since Farmers used a broader definition of the
term "insured," it provides broader coverage, including claims by
resident relatives who are named in their own policies.5 7 The in-
jured claimant is an insured under the policy. The statute allows
him to recover second priority benefits from the policy which in-
sures him. No "closeness to the risk" analysis is appropriate.
Having incorrectly elected to use a "closeness to the risk"
analysis, the Heinen court then goes on to misapply the "closeness
to the risk" standards. On the facts in Heinen, neither of the two
excess policies is closer to the risk than the other. The court's at-
tempt to apply the doctrine actually supports the conclusion that
neither of the identical policies was closer to the risk than the
other.
Reviewing the factors from Auto Owners, and properly applying
them to the policies illustrates this point.
1. Which policy specifically identifies the accident causing instru-
mentality?
Neither the Farmers policy namingJamie Heinen, nor the pol-
icy insuring him as a resident relative identifies the "accident caus-
ing instrumentality." He was in a friend's car. The friend's car is
not mentioned in either policy issued by Farmers. The Heinen
court ignores the undisputed facts in the case and somehow con-
cludes that Jamie Heinen's policy identified the "accident-causing
instrumentality."
The court cited no language from either insurance policy to
support its conclusion. Indeed, since each policy at issue was a
standard Farmers auto insurance policy, it is likely that the policy
language in each was identical. The Heinen court was simply in-
correct in concluding that one policy identified the injury causing
instrumentality.
If the first "closeness to the risk" standard were correctly ap-
plied, it would be concluded that the two Farmers' policies were
equally applicable. Each provided identical excess insurance cov-
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erage.
2. Which premium is reflective of the greater contemplated exposure?
In Heinen, neither policy reflected greater exposure. Since
one policy had higher UIM limits, it likely had a higher premium
for the higher limits than the other policy. The premiums for each
policy equally reflect the same contemplated exposure.
The court noted that Heinen had paid premiums for his own
policy. The court does not explain why this fact has any possible
relevance to the case. The identity of the person who paid the
premium had nothing to do with the risks covered by each policy.
Since the language in each policy is identical, there is no rational
basis for concluding that the policies are intended to cover differ-
ent risks.
In fact, both Farmers policies contemplated that they would be
primary only if Heinen were injured while occupying the specific
vehicle identified in each policy. Each UIM premium reflects the
primary exposure tied to use of a specific vehicle. Each contem-
plates that secondary excess exposure will arise whenever the injury
occurs outside of identified vehicle.
3. Does one policy contemplate the risk so that coverage of the risk is
primary in one policy and incidental to the other?
It should be judged that the legislature has answered this ques-
tion with respect to UM and UIM coverage. The coverage on the
occupied car is primary and all other applicable coverage is excess.
The Heinen court did not demonstrate that one of these policies,
each with identical language, was closer to the risk. It concluded
that "the premium charged is related to the contemplated risk." It
cites absolutely no evidence concerning the underwriting standards
used to identify the "contemplated risk." In reality, both policies
explicitly contemplated providing primary coverage only when the
injured person occupied the insured vehicle. Each policy equally
contemplated a second priority UIM coverage, and this coverage
was explicitly extended by each contract both to the named insured
and to the insured family members. The risks contemplated by
each policy were identical.
A sensible review of the "closeness to the risk" analysis in the
Heinen case clearly indicates that the policies were equally close to
the risk. This is because both policies fall in the same priority for
coverage as mandated by section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5). Using
the "closeness to the risk" analysis does not demonstrate that the
policy which named Jamie Heinen was any closer to the risk than
[Vol. 24
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the policy insuring him by virtue of his resident relative status.
It is also clear that the Heinen court knew the Farmers policy
with UIM limits of $100,000, included a broader definition of the
term "insured" than required by statute. The court was certainly
aware that the statutory priorities scheme would have required the
claimant to make the claim with his own policy if Farmers had in-
38cluded the statutory definition. The court explicitly stated that
the Farmers policy offered broader UIM coverage than the mini-
mum required by statute in using the broader definition of "in-
sured. 39 Under Austin Mutual Insurance Co. v. Templin,40 the court
should have availed the insured to the broader coverage under the
terms of the policy as written. Instead of requiring Farmers to pro-
vide the broader coverage it included, the court inexplicably af-
forded Farmers the benefit of the narrower statutory definition it
did not include.
The Heinen decision appears to be a fairly clear example ofju-
dicial legislation. It appears that the Heinen court simply wanted
the injured person to be limited to the coverage which he pur-
chased. The court judged this to be fair since this would have been
the result if the insurer had not chosen to broaden its coverage
through an expanded definition of the term "insured." Heinen in-
appropriately attempted to apply the "closeness to the risk" analysis
tojustify its end. It then misapplied the analysis. It deprived an in-
jured claimant from recovering insurance benefits for which pre-
miums had been paid for the risk, and which clearly insured the
loss for the claimant.
V. CONCLUSION
Heinen and Frishman are incorrect decisions because each mis-
applies the "closeness to the risk" doctrine. First, the doctrine
never should have been used in these cases. Second, once used, it
was inappropriately applied to the facts. The closeness to the risk
doctrine should never result in denying an injured claimant access
to applicable insurance coverage. There is no precedent in Minne-
sota for this use of the "closeness to the risk" doctrine.
More importantly, both decisions ignore the statutorily man-
dated priorities at section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5). The statute
38. See Heinen, 566 N.W.2d at 380.
39. Id.
40. 435 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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precludes any "closeness to the risk" analysis for excess UIM or UM
claims. An insurance company has the option of avoiding the is-
sues raised by Heinen and Frishman if the insurance company adopts
in its UM and UIM policies the statutory definition of "insured" in
Minnesota Statutes section 65B.43, subdivision 5. If an insurance
company chooses to expand its UM and UIM coverages by using a
broad definition of "insured" the courts should reasonably require
the company to honor the terms of its contract and to provide the
coverage which has in fact been purchased.
Requiring insurers to provide the coverage under the terms of
the policy as written is imperative. It is consistent with the No-Fault
Act and with settled Minnesota case law to allow injured claimants
to recover from insurance policies which clearly cover them. It is
not appropriate for courts to misapply a sequencing doctrine such
as "closeness to the risk" to deprive injured individuals of insurance
benefits.
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